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David Granger has written a wonderful book. As I read, I often paused, put it down, 
and thought. He synthesizes a great deal of work from varied sources, including 
Stanley Cavell, the British Romantics, Emerson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Plato, and 
Aristotle while expositing contemporary pragmatic aesthetics as exemplified by 
Richard Shusterman, Philip W. Jackson, and Thomas M. Alexander. Granger re-
lies on Alexander’s idea of “the human ero-s” as seeking to live a life of expanding 
meaning and value. This breadth is necessary given the topic—John Dewey and 
Robert Pirsig’s “Art of Living.”
I have sometimes mentioned to those who have read Pirsig that they already 
have insight into Dewey. We use technology (e.g., motorcycles) to mediate between 
immediate consummatory experiences, although there are always moments when 
the artistic practice (e.g., creating or maintaining the technology or the method of 
inquiry) is itself an aesthetic experience. I now realize those who have read Dewey 
also have insight into Pirsig, who is a first-rate philosopher in the etymological 
sense. Pirsig and Dewey are friends of wisdom.
Granger organizes his book around four questions. The first asks: “What sort 
of world is it that makes art as experience possible?” He devotes the first two chap-
ters, titled “Dewey’s and Pirsig’s Metaphysics” and “Metaphysics at Work,” to his 
answer. Granger affirms Dewey’s claim that there “are two sorts of worlds in which 
esthetic experience would not occur” (Granger, 9). A world of pure flux could never 
move to a consummation while an entirely finished world forbids further creative 
action. Dewey’s existential generic traits, especially the relatively precarious and 
relatively stable, pair with the “static” and “Dynamic” in Pirsig’s “Metaphysics of 
Quality.” Dewey assails analytic logic-chopping in favor of a textured holism that 
makes suitable distinctions when needed. In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Main-
tenance (ZMM), Pirsig complains about the “Church of Reason” whose “mythos” 
proclaims: “the forms of this world are real but the Quality of this world unreal 
. . . insane!” (318). Granger explores this metaphysical madness.
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Chapters 3, “Dewey’s and Pirsig’s Aesthetics,” and 4, “Pragmatist Aesthetics 
and Romanticism,” address the question: “What is the general nature of aesthetic 
experience and how might it serve to nurture the human ero-s?” Granger explores 
Pirsig’s and Dewey’s aesthetics by examining their similarities to the British Ro-
mantics, especially Wordsworth’s natural supernaturalism. A partial list of the 
elements of what Dewey calls “an experience” include individualizing quality, 
dynamic unity (even of opposites), self-sufficiency, immediacy, ineffability, and 
multiple kinds of continuity. We also find these characteristics in Pirsig’s depiction 
of “high quality” experience.
Pirsig remarks: “The study of the art of motorcycle maintenance is really a 
miniature study of the art of rationality itself” (ZMM, 84). Ultimately, concepts, 
categories, categorical systems, and discursive thought itself are all artistic cre-
ations. The “Church of Reason” dogmatically denigrates noncognitive meanings, 
renders ethical meanings secondary, and elides aesthetic visions of the possible be-
yond the actual. It dismisses metaphors, metronomes, similes, and such as simply 
logical errors (e.g., category mistakes). The irony, as Granger shows, is that formal 
logic itself is an art form.
The third question asks: “How might art as experience contribute to an ev-
eryday poetics of living?” Chapters 5, “The Poetics of Cultural Renewal,” and 6, 
“The Poetics of Personal Renewal,” answer this question by investigating issues of 
self and society while building on Pirsig’s and Dewey’s efforts to seize aesthetic ex-
perience from “the Artworld” and restore it to everyday life, from whence it came 
and must ultimately return. Relying on the work of Emerson, and Cavell’s exposi-
tion of Emersion, chapter 5 shows how to acknowledge the skeptical impulse with-
out allowing it to overwhelm us. We must learn to live not only without ultimate 
epistemological foundation, but also with the bottomlessness of our own being. 
This chapter features a wonderful exposition of Coleridge’s “The Ancient Mari-
ner” as an allegory of skepticism. The continual poetic creation of “high quality” 
moments and meanings leads to continuous cultural renewal, thereby overcom-
ing the paralysis of skepticism while acknowledging its claims. “Heaven above,” 
finds Pirsig, “fades from meaning when space-age consciousness asks, Where is 
‘above’?” (ZMM 168). For every God that dies, we must either create another or, 
better, recreate ourselves.
Eventually, questions about cultural renewal involve questions of personal 
renewal. Granger thinks Emerson and Pirsig overemphasize the inner sources 
of renewal in ways that can cut individuals off from culture, other persons, and 
even their own body, which are often sources of personal renewal. Self-absorption 
frequently inhibits self-expression. Granger shows how Dewey balances self with 
society by seeking to educate truly unique individuals capable of making original 
contributions to cultural renewal, which, reciprocally, provides resources for in-
dividual renewal within the communal circle.
Granger’s last question is: “What kinds of learning environments—formal 
and informal—help to foster art as experience?” Chapter 7, “Learning and Teach-
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ing Art as Experience,” provides useful answers. He worries that discipline-based 
art education repeats “the Artworld” opinion of art while asserting rigid educa-
tional standards of beauty. Granger urges us to avoid what he calls “mimetic in-
struction,” where the student’s task requires passively copying the form proffered 
by the instructor and filling it with the instructor’s content. Pirsig objects to the 
ancient “Church” dogma bequeathed by Socrates that “all things which are to be 
taught must first be defined” (ZMM 187). Pirsig remarks: “When I say, ‘Quality’ 
cannot be defined,’ I’m really saying formally ‘I’m stupid about Quality’” (ZMM 
185). Dewey and Pirsig agree that the immediate aesthetic experience of Quality 
lies beyond the limits of language, although we may gesture toward it. Granger 
expounds on the necessity of students and teachers making meaning together in 
creative community where the results are not entirely specifiable in advance. My 
institution is NCATE approved. NCATE demands “rubrics” for everything; the 
result is consistently low quality educational experiences.
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